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Difficult Dialogues: 
The Technologies and 
Limits of Reconciliation 
DAWNE MOON 
Projects known as dialogue or reconciliation build on the common ground 
between members of historically adversarial groups to help overcome vicious 
cycles of retaliation. They do so by helping people to relate, in Martin Buber's 
(1970 [1923]) sense of the term, to those they perceive as "Other," and thus to 
transform through interaction how they define themselves. While some posit 
that the deep interpersonal understanding that reconciliation fosters is actu-
ally central to most or all religious traditions, reconciliation projects can also 
facilitate a mode of non-institutional spirituality, thus inviting us to explore 
one of the sociology of religion's "edges" this volume seeks to re-center. In 
this mode, participants may see institutional religion as fallible and human 
but see reconciliation as bringing contact with something transcendent and 
universal-a truth long known in their particular religious heritage, and oth-
ers as well, but forgotten in many institutions. Such reconciliation projects 
may be experienced as "spiritual" rather than "religious," transforming selves 
precisely by bringing together people who might normally be institution-
ally segregated. At the same time, instances such as those I discuss here can 
only arise when they are explicitly distanced from politics, and thus para-
doxically they may reproduce the very hierarchies some participants wish to 
overcome. 
While this research ventures outside of congregations and looks at move-
that cross religiOUS boundaries, its real force lies at a different edge of 
sociology of religion by helping us to locate the ambiguous effects of the 
r ... ",~cu"-feeling efforts at dialogue or reconciliation and the ways these 
can both inspire and frustrate desires for political transformation and 
. It has been argued that lasting political transformation depends on 
in how people identify themselves as members of a group in relation to 
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other groups (Todd 2005). Not all participants are drawn to reconciliation/dia-
logue because they want to effect political change, however; many simply are 
tired of political conflict and the violence it involves. For these dialogue efforts 
to be fully effective, they need parties from either side of a historical conflict, 
and this is why it resides at a point of tension. To elucidate this tension, I begin 
by exploring how these groups can be effective; I then explore the limitations 
of dialogue, focusing on the paradox that emerges when the groups in question 
are characterized by an imbalance of power or privilege. 
I compare observations from two studies of religious and religio-ethnic 
communities. The more recent is a qualitative study of American Jews' under-
standings and experiences of anti-Semitism and how it relates to politics, par-
ticularly around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.1 I compare some of the findings 
from this study with findings that emerged in my earlier ethnographic research 
on debates about homosexuality within the United Methodist Church (Moon 
2004, 2005a, 2005b). In the broader study of American Jews and their under-
standings and experiences of anti-Semitism, I used voice-recorded intensive 
interviews with a snowball sample of thirty-two respondents, ranging from 
one hour to three-and-one-half hours. 2 Here I focus on two closely related 
organizations that were a subset of this research, an international dialogue 
and peace organization called Listening with Love, and a loose network of local 
groups called Palestinian-Jewish Reconciliation Circles that meet monthly, 
usually in different members' homes, to share their stories and practice listen-
ing attentively to each other in order to overcome suspicion, defensiveness, 
and hatred. 3 Interviews were grounded in and supplemented with participant 
observation in workshops and public forums, including a two-weekend train-
ing session with Listening with Love and a four-day retreat organized by the 
core members of a Reconciliation Circle. I also draw here from interviews with 
members of an organization called Jews for a Just and Lasting Peace, which 
engages the conflict in the Middle East at the political level, but whose members 
echo some principles of dialogue. Because these concepts grew out of a study 
of Jews, I have so far interviewed a relatively small number of Palestinians. 
While Palestinian perspectives will be the focus of future research, critiques 
that have emerged in the current research have been sufficient to point to some 
of the tensions inherent in dialogue and reconciliation. 
Discussions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are invariably controversial, 
especially when one discusses power. To be sure, there is a huge range of opinion 
among Israelis, Palestinians, and others who identify with either or both groups, 
and this chapter explores some of the middle ground. However, the basic con-
flict might be roughly summarized as follows. To many Palestinians, Israel is a 
militarily strong occupying government founded unjustly and illegitimately on 
Palestinian lands, and now funded largely by the United States, whose forces 
have and continue to dispossess and dehumanize people in the West Bank and 
Difficult Dialogues 181 
Gaza by taking away their livelihoods; cordoning them off into isolated areas 
where water, food, and medical treatment are scarce and difficult to access; tear-
ing down people's homes at will; appropriating their land; imprisoning people 
indefinitely without charge; and consigning people to refugee camps. While 
Palestinian citizens of Israel are treated better and have some rights, they expe-
rience discrimination, for instance, in unrecognized Arab towns that receive 
inferior government services. To many who identify with the state of Israel, 
Palestinians are a group of Arabs, politically backed (but perhaps abandoned 
when it comes to humanitarian support) by the entire Arab world, determined 
to eradicate the Jewish presence in the Middle East and killing Israelis in ran-
dom terrorist attacks to make their point.4 During the Nazi Holocaust, which 
was one among many large-scale attacks on Jews historically, many Jewish 
refugees literally had nowhere to go; shiploads of people were turned away from 
the United States and other countries and sent back to Europe to face what-
ever dangers they might. The state of Israel, born in the wake of World War II, 
became both a symbol of redemption and a desperately needed refuge. That ref-
uge is a tiny country, the size of New Jersey, subject to attacks, both violent 
and discursive. Some have argued that the state of Israel is subject to a "new 
anti-Semitism" that uses the same tropes as traditional anti-Semitism but on a 
global scale: they see the Jewish state being verbally attacked and delegitimated, 
held accountable for offenses that draw little international notice when commit-
ted by other countries, and scapegoated for offenses committed by many gov-
ernments (Chesler 2003; Dershowitz 2003; Foxman 2003). Many of my Jewish 
interview subjects identified to some extent with the state of Israel, and at the 
same time, many were critical of its treatment of the Palestinians. 
My interview pool was not representative of the American Jewish public. 5 
Most of the Jews I spoke to in this research came from families that ardently 
supported the state of Israel, but many respondents experienced a feeling of 
awakening when they learned of the Palestinian perspective. Some went to Israel 
and saw the way Palestinian citizens of Israel, as well as residents of the West 
Bank or Gaza, were treated. For others that feeling came when they saw a play 
or read a book that prompted them to question the definition of the situation 
with which they had grown up, and for others yet it was simple exhaustion with 
all the violence that led them to look for a way to bring about peace or prompted 
them to find out "the other side of the story." Some have come to the conclusion 
after looking into the situation that Israel has the upper hand in relations with 
the Palestinians in terms of wealth and military power. Rather than seeing ter-
rorism against Israel as one among many examples throughout world history of 
anti-Semitism-the term David Norman Smith (1996) reserves for the mythol-
ogization of Jews as chimeric monsters (controllers of the world economy and 
media, eaters of Christian children, and the like)-some see attacks on the 
state of Israel as part of an ordinary conflict like other international conflicts 
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over ordinary issues including borders and resources.6 Given that the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is one of the two main factors Cohen and Eisen (2000) see 
as contributing to a decline in the centrality of the state of Israel to American 
Jews, it is likely that these findings may become more relevant in the future. 
Theorizing the Selfin Interaction 
This chapter explores the intersection of politics with the self, which sociologi-
cal theories of the self have generally ignored. Mead (1967 [1934]) argued that 
to be a person means internalizing the generalized other's view of the "me," see-
ing myself as others see me. He argued that we only become persons in interac-
tion, that each human organism (his term) is at once an individual "I" and an 
embodiment of his or her society, an object to himself or herself as much as to 
those around him or her. But for all his importance and influence in sociology, 
Mead's concept of the generalized other is a bit too simple.7 The concepts of 
Martin Buber (1965, 1970 [1923]) help us to understand the transformation 
of the self that can occur in dialogue to produce intersubjectivity between par-
ties who once viewed each other as Other, as outside their moral world. Like 
Pagis's study of Vip ass ana meditation (this volume), attention to Buber's analy-
sis helps us to rethink Mead's conception of the self and its relationship to the 
generalized other. 
For Buber, the inherent duality of humanity is not "the I and the me," as it is 
for Mead, but two kinds of "1." He distinguishes the "I" in an I-it experience-
when the other is regarded as an object of contemplation, of discovery, even of 
affection-from the "I" in an intimate, I-you (Ich-Du, often translated as I-thou) 
relationship.8 For Buber, a relationship with the intimate you occurs when for 
each person the other is "infinitely there," touching the core of the self. It may 
sound a bit mystical, but as a sociologist, Buber insisted that the communion 
between souls that can happen when they relate in what he calls dialogue is a 
real occurrence, much as the communion people experience in collective effer-
vescence is a concrete, empirical reality in Durkheim's (1995 [1912]) theoriza-
tion. As Buber explains in his 1929 essay "Dialogue,"9 to engage in dialogue is 
to open oneself to being touched at the core, stepping out of the "armor" we 
wear in everyday life. For Buber, when someone "says" something to me, in a 
song, a sermon, a lecture, or a conversation, for instance, he or she touches me 
at the core. To be attentive is Buber's term for being open to such a connection. 
Buber is careful to point out that I-it interactions are essential, and not nec-
essarily negative; asking a professor to explain a concept, for instance, or ask-
ing for directions or medical advice is essential to functioning in the world, 
but a problem emerges when this kind of interaction is mistaken for relating. 
For Buber, the I of the I-it experience is the ego, who "occupies himself with 
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his My: my manner, my race, my works, my genius," while the I of the I-you 
relationship is the person, who is open to "infinite conversation" (1970 [1923], 
114). He remarks: 
Egos appear by setting themselves apart from other egos. 
Persons appear by entering into relation to other persons. 
One is the spiritual form of natural differentiation, the other that of 
natural association. 
The purpose of setting oneself apart is to experience and use .... 
The purpose of relation is the relation itself-touching the You. (1970 
[1923], 112-113) 
For Buber, relating to another person transforms the self; its lack of instrumen-
tality and its mutual understanding resonate with Habermas's concept of com-
municative rationality. We have all probably had such moments, though like 
affect, they are difficult to know in another or to describe in any way resem-
bling "objectivity." 
Buber distinguishes true relating from imitations. He distinguishes "genu-
ine dialogue" from "technical dialogue," which is solely concerned with gain-
ing objective understanding, and "monologue disguised as dialogue," in which 
"two or more men, meeting in space, speak each with himself in strangely tor-
tuous and circuitous ways and yet imagine they have escaped the torment of 
being thrown back on their own resources" (a description that evokes graduate 
seminars a bit more than any of us might like; 1965, 19). Under this heading, 
he includes debate, in which "in the speaking are so pointed that they may strike 
home in the sharpest way, and moreover without the men that are spoken to 
being regarded in anyway present as persons"; conversation, marked "solely by 
the desire to have one's own self-reliance confirmed by marking the impression 
that is made"; and other facsimiles of dialogue that separate people rather than 
connect them (1965, 19-20). These distinctions acknowledge that genuine dia-
logue can be difficult to achieve, especially when egos intervene. I suggest that 
egos are not the only thing that can intervene; hierarchies of authority can 
prevent relating, even as relating can disrupt hierarchy. 
The dialogue groups I observed work by getting people into a room together 
with those they view as opponents and keeping them all coming back. Such 
processes thus depend on participants not becoming too alienated or threat-
ened, even if the legitimacy of their tacit authority is challenged. Since dis-
cussions of politics can easily degenerate from debate into shouting matches 
that could drain participants of energy for no reward, dialogue groups walk 
a fine line. As Amanda Udis-Kessler (2008) demonstrates in her study of the 
United Methodist General Conference of 2000, when opponents convene to 
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make policy decisions without the transformation of consciousness that comes 
from relating to each other in Buber's sense, the interaction can feel like a war 
between groups from utterly different moral worlds (see also Hunter 1992): 
Thus, dialogue groups endeavor to avoid politics, focusing on giving each par-
ticipant the time and space to "tell their story," speaking "from their hearts." 
In doing so, they give participants the opportunity to humanize each other, to 
see each other as members of the same moral community (Baumann 1989; Fein 
1979; Tavuchis 1991). Broadening the moral community changes the "gener-
alized other" one internalizes, and thus changes the self by internalizing the 
gaze of, rather than repudiating, those once deemed anathema. 
Relating Versus Knowing One 
Buber's distinction between relating and experiencing helps us to understand 
a puzzle that emerged in my earlier research on debates about homosexuality 
in the United Methodist Church, or UMC. I would ask my interview respon-
dents how they had come to their current views. Those who believed that 
homosexuality was sinful cited a range of things: the Bible, their comfort about 
their convictions (which, as one woman remarked, God would surely disturb 
were she on the wrong track), their knowledge that God loved order and that 
homosexuality flouted it. In contrast, I was struck by pro-gay church members' 
recurring accounts of gay people close to them: a brother who had come out 
recently; a gay friend, relative, or child; a speaker who expressed pain at being 
shut out of the church. In spite of the mainstream lesbian, gay, bisexual, ~nd 
transgender (LGBT) movement's strategy of "coming out," encouraging every 
LGBT person to make her or his sexual orientation or gender identity known 
to friends, coworkers, neighbors, and everyone else, it seemed a facile truism 
that "knowing one" made all the difference. After all, plenty of members of the 
congregations I studied also knew gay men or lesbians and still believed homo-
sexuality to be sinful-in their view, wanting to be nice to gay men and les-
bians at the expense of upholding the word of God was understandable, but 
sinful, and would condemn to hell those one should be helping to find salvation. 
Similarly, in Udis-Kessler's study, pro-gay "inclusionists" chanted slogans such 
as "See our people" and "Know your people" (2008, 64) and tried to encourage 
delegates to get to know LGBT participants, but neither strategy moved those 
who believed that knowing gay people was beside the fact that homosexuality 
was sinful. Again, the assumption that "knowing one" was sufficient to change 
minds led pro-gay members to make an argument that seemed irrelevant to 
their opponents. 
When my research moved into the arena of American Jewish understand-
ings of anti-Semitism and its relationship to Middle East politics, I finally 
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understood what I had been seeing. Again, the theme of "knowing one" came 
back. For instance, Julia, a 57-year-old Jewish environmental activist and art-
ist, told me about how reading Israeli geographer Meron Benvenisti's (2002) 
Sacred Landscape opened her eyes to the Palestinians' experience of Israel, a 
country she had loved since her childhood. She remarked: 
And you know it's a great sadness to me, one of the first things I'll 
often say to a Jewish person if they have a lot of, you know, what I 
would say are misperceptions, I would say, "Have you, do you have any 
Palestinian friends? Do you even know any Palestinians?" And almost 
across the board, no. They might have met a Palestinian shopkeeper. 
They never exchanged stories. After I read that book I went around 
and I would meet Palestinians in many places, there are lots of them 
here and as soon as they might say where they were from, Ramallah 
or Hebron or somewhere, I would say, "My name is Julia, I'm Jewish, 
I'm really sorry." And instantly, everyone of them, from old, grizzled 
men to young girls, all, just filled with the anger of the Palestinian 
cause, would embrace me. Everyone of them would open their heart 
immediately, just by my saying that, just saying, "I understand what 
happened to your people, and I'm sorry." And one couple of brothers in 
Taos, New Mexico, they brought out the Qur'an and showed me where 
Muhammad says, "See, he says we're supposed to all be like broth-
ers, Christian, Jew, and Muslims across the board." Just saying I'm 
a Jewish person and I'm sorry for what happened to them. I couldn't 
help it. I just felt so terrible. lo 
Nicholas Tavuchis (1991) argues that apology is an effort to reestablish mem-
bership in one's moral community when one has violated its norms, saying: 
[Alpology expresses itself as the exigency of a painful re-membering, lit-
erally of being mindful again of what we were and had as members and, 
at the same time, what we have jeopardized or lost by virtue of our offen-
sive speech or action. And it is only by personally acknowledging ultimate 
responsibility, expressing genuine sorrow and regret ... that the offender 
simultaneously recalls and is re-called to that which binds. (1991, 8) 
In Julia's case, the apology is to people who are often seen as belonging to a dif-
ferent moral community; Julia's apology is in effect a claim that she and those 
to whom she is apologizing do belong to the same moral community, a claim 
affirmed in the New Mexico men's invocation of the Qur'an. It is not simply 
"knowing one" that makes the difference; relating, in Buber's sense, implies see-
ing another as part of one's moral community, or as Habermas might say, as part 
of one's lifeworld. 
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Julia described a trip she had taken to Israel with Listening with Love 
(LWL), an international organization that seeks to foster relating between 
members of historically opposed groups. The organization offers training and 
practice sessions to teach antagonists to hear and understand each other so 
they may move beyond the cycle of mutual suspicion, hatred, and defensive-
ness. Listening with Love posits that human beings are all linked by a core, 
fundamental "essence" of "values that we all share," including love, safety, 
compassion, beauty, courage, creativity, freedom, friendship, generosity, joy, 
truth, trust, and the like, and its organizers facilitate dialogue between Jews 
and Arabs, Jews and Germans, and other historically antagonistic groups. The 
organization also offers training sessions so that people may learn their tech-
niques and apply them in their daily lives. At the training session I attended, 
facilitators presented their model: each human being has a core, which has been 
wounded by life's disappointments, injuries, injustices, and attacks. Defenses, 
or what Buber (1965, 10-11) calls "armor," have grown to protect those wounds 
and the vulnerable core, but they can be counterproductive as they often pre-
vent people from relating to each other, or in LWL's terms, from seeing each 
other's "true self." The organization teaches that the extreme of defenses argu-
ing back and forth at each other is war, but when people can open themselves to 
each other, telling their stories and being heard, then peace is possible. 
The process thus resembles the evangelical Protestant process of racial 
reconciliation that Emerson and Smith (2000) discuss. In their account, 
which summarizes Yancey's (1998) analysis, reconciliation as it was defined 
by the early founders of the movement takes place in four steps: (1) develop-
ing primary relationships across racial lines, (2) recognizing social struc-
tures of inequality, (3) whites' repenting "of their personal, historical, and 
social sins," and (4) African Americans' willingness to forgive, individually 
and corporately, when asked, repenting of anger and whatever hatred they 
hold toward whites and the system (see Emerson and Smith 2000, 54-55). 
As Emerson and Smith found, however, the recognition of social structural 
imbalance implicit in the model brought a political element into reconcili-
ation that cohered in no way with white evangelicals' worldview and thus 
found resistance. Efforts at reconciliation without acknowledgement of 
social structural hierarchies could result in blacks feeling that their white 
counterparts were making a shallow effort at best. Emerson and Smith 
describe the beginnings of reconciliation theology in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, saying: 
Some of the white elite evangelicals attempted reconciliation, but 
incompletely. The problem with whites' conception of reconciliation, 
many claimed, was that they did not seek true justice-that is, jus-
tice both individually and collectively. Without this component, 
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reconciliation was' cheap, artificial, and mere words. It was rather like 
a big brother shoving his little brother to the ground, apologizing, and 
then shoving him to the ground again. (2000, 58) 
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Later, I will explore similar political tensions in the dialogue/reconciliation 
movements I discuss here, but first it is important to acknowledge that even 
when the process is incomplete, it can have some of its desired effects. First, 
dialogue and reconciliation processes can indeed help to humanize adver-
saries, which may be no small feat. At a retreat organized by the Palestinian-
Jewish Reconciliation Circle, a Palestinian-American woman I estimated to 
be in her thirties who was active in the movement spoke of having been 
raised on stories of what "the Jews" did to her family in 1948-taking their 
homes, making them into refugees. She felt she was raised to hate, but she 
didn't want to raise her own children that way, so the Reconciliation Circle 
offered her the opportunity to overcome that legacy without having to for-
get the past. Others, who had never had the opportunity to talk to someone 
from the other side of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, became friends with 
them and felt hope that peace was actually possible. At a press conference 
after the event, an Israeli woman whose son was serving in the Israeli army 
spoke of having met a 16-year-old exchange student to the United States 
from Iraq: 
He said, "Don't hate me, but growing up, my parents taught me that 
we have to hate you, that you are awful people." After a half hour of 
wonderful dialogue, he said, "I'm sorry I feel this way; you are actu-
ally sweet." We greeted each other every morning with a smile and 
a kiss; now I'm going home to tell my son that peace is possible. 
[Reconstructed in notes] 
While simply learning that adversaries are human might seem so simple as to 
be banal, it can actually be profoundly terrifying, troubling one's worldview 
and pre-existing relationships. Ken, a 69-year-old retired pediatrician and the 
organizer of a Reconciliation Circle, remarked on the "great courage" it can take 
to participate, mostly because of the fear of what one's "own people" would say. 
He commented: 
We're talking about fear. Fear, part of it is fear not only of the Other, 
but also of your own people .... You're seen as a traitor, you're seen as 
naIve, you're seen as not intelligent, which is a terrible thing in the 
Jewish community. You're seen as on the Left. Oh my goodness. It 
takes great courage to move out to the Other. You take flak from your 
own people, usually. 
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To illustrate this difficulty, Ken told me about an incident with a local 
newspaper: 
The most powerful criticism dynamic that I have had is, a couple of years 
ago, in the local Jewish newspaper, there was exaggerated demonization 
of the Palestinian people, the Palestinian schools, and the Palestinian 
textbooks. And I am familiar with the university-based research about 
those things. And this article was hateful. And there was a photograph 
of like a 3-year-old Palestinian with a Kalashnikov, semiautomatic rifle 
that somebody took somewhere ... [a]nd the point was, "They're teach-
ing all their children to kill all the Jews." And I just couldn't [let that 
go], so I wrote an OpEd, an opinion-editorial, and I simply quoted the 
Israeli academicians and their findings of the Palestinian textbooks, and 
schools .... I just quoted academics, but [people in the area] projected the 
worst things onto [my wife] and me, and onto the Reconciliation Circle. 
They took out ads, actually, in the newspaper. ... And, they just called us 
all the names, you know: naIve, traitors, um, Arab-sympathizers .... 
In his comments, he demonstrated the effectiveness of the dialogue techniques 
he had honed in the Reconciliation Circle, saying: 
And you know what I did? I phoned everyone of them. And you know 
what? The ads disappeared, in two weeks the letters were over, and I 
would say I'm still in relationship with the people who wrote them. I 
phoned them and I really listened to them. I asked them what their 
stories were, I got into their frame of reference. They felt heard. I felt 
understood. I told them what my motive was. It wasn't done from a 
distance of blaming or fist-[shaking] across a campus green. 
In addition to humanizing the Other, Ken reveals how such processes can 
impart skills for de-escalating conflicts, as well as building relationships with 
past adversaries. 
Habermas's distinction between the formal world and the lifeworldis instruc-
tive. The lifeworld is what constitutes mutual understanding, while formal 
world concepts constitute a reference system about which mutual understand-
ing is possible (1981, 126). The lifeworld is the realm of the taken-for-granted 
and, in Buber's terms, of the real relationships that shape us at the core, while 
the formal system is a realm of solely I-it interactions. To problematize the life-
world is to destabilize a person's whole worldview and problematize the core of 
the person, as happens when people observe a reality that does not conform 
to their symbolic imaginary: when people from either side realize that the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not the battle between good and evil they may 
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have assumed it to be; or when they realize homosexuality is not actually the 
derangement or evil it symbolizes in heterosexist common sense. 
Dialogue humanizes the Other, transforming the self in the process. When 
dialogue works best, participants come to see each other not as representa-
tives of evil forces that have been out to destroy them, but "as human beings"; 
in other words, like apology in Tavuchis's formulation, dialogue allows people 
to see each other as members of the same moral community. Even people who 
have hurt and killed others, such as Combatants for Peace (the real name of 
an organization of former Israeli soldiers and Palestinian fighters), can come 
together, admit to the harm they have caused others, and explain why it seemed 
justified at the time, as well as how they have since come to see otherwise. 
People who seemed to occupy the formal world, the world of objects-violent, 
oppressive, frightening, selfish, impure, chaotic-enter into the lifeworld, the 
realm where mutual understanding is possible, the realm of relating. Regarding 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, dialogue participants come to see people who 
"love peace" as part of the "us," while they see those who seem to prefer war-
governments, war profiteers, the hateful-as the redefined outsiders. They 
do so at some risk, however-they risk the security of their old view for the 
unknown. In Ken's words, they risk alienating their "own people"; they stand to 
forego a relatively popular position of "we're good, they're evil" for a rarer one, 
and most frighteningly for detractors, they risk making themselves open and 
vulnerable to people who could exploit their weaknesses. 
When Jewish people such as Ken and Julia related to Arabs and Arab 
Americans, and when Arabs related to Jews, they regarded the Other as part 
of their moral community, and it was simply implausible that an entire peo-
ple could be inherently violent, less loving, or less deserving of a happy life. 
Similarly, relating to someone who was gay or lesbian, in my earlier research, 
made the stigmatization of gays and lesbians seem preposterous, dangerous, 
and profoundly unfair. When respondents, including some members of the 
conservative congregation I studied, related to gay men or lesbians, it became 
implausible to them that God could find gay intimacy more sinful than het-
erosexual intimacy or find gay people to be less capable than heterosexuals 
of doing God's work. The distinction between knowing and relating helps to 
explain why pro-gay strategies fail to transform those who believe homosex-
uality is sinful-relating emerges organically; like collective effervescence, it 
cannot be simply willed into existence among the unwilling. 
The Politics of Dialogue 
To introduce the concept of dialogue, Buber tells a story about a meeting he 
attended in 1914, where someone raised an objection to too many Jews being 
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nominated to help form an international organization. Sensing anti-Semitism 
on the part of the objector, Buber raised his own objection. He writes: 
I no longer know how from that I came to speak of Jesus and to say 
that we Jews knew him from within, in the impulses and stirrings 
of his Jewish being, in a way that remains inaccessible to the peoples 
submissive to him. "In a way that remains inaccessible to you" -so I 
directly addressed the former clergyman. He stood up, I too stood, we 
looked into the heart of one another's eyes. "It is gone," he said, and 
before everyone we gave each other the kiss of brotherhood .... In this 
transformation dialogue was fulfilled. Opinions were gone, in a bodily 
way the factual took place. (1965, 5-6) 
In Buber's account, speaking from his heart to someone open to him trans-
formed the man, his objection, and their relationship. But what if the Christian 
man had not been open to Buber's words? What if he felt a personal stake in 
maintaining his authority as a Christian to decide how many Jews should be 
permitted into their group? 
What those who called Ken a traitor may have sensed was that in addi-
tion to humanizing the other and teaching skills for de-escalating conflict, 
dialogue can inspire people to learn about power dynamics they hadn't 
known about, a step Yancey sees as crucial to early reconciliation theolo-
gians' process. For instance, Julia, who had gone on the trip to Israel with 
LWL, remarked: 
One reason I went on this trip is that I felt that so many Jews didn't 
have the full story. That we had been given a lot of information that 
didn't allow us to see and understand the humanity of the other 
side and their suffering .... I wanted to go and with my own eyes 
and ears come back with the stories that I could then bring back to 
Jews. And part of me felt like, "Well, Israel doesn't really need the 
American Jews," but it turns out so much money is coming from 
American Jews that's going into terrible projects, that are making 
things worse, that Israel desperately needs an enlightened American 
Jewish public. In fact, the American Jewish [public] is more pro-
Zionist than the Israelis by and large. Because we're blinder, because 
we're not living there and not seeing and understanding the com-
plexity, the great complexity, the chaos and confusion and the suf-
fering on all sides. 
Similarly, 42-year-old Lisa belonged to Jews for a Just and Lasting Peace 
(JJLP), an organization that seeks to work in solidarity with the Palestinians. 
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Having grown up with a grandfather she admired and saw as a model of 
Jewish ethics, she had always understood that being Jewish meant both 
fighting racism and supporting the state of Israel. She experienced a moral 
crisis upon her first visit to Israel and Gaza when she was in her twenties, 
having seen Israelis treat Palestinians in ways she could only describe as pro-
foundly racist. She told me of the difficulties she had with her father over 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, given their family's intense commitment to 
Zionism. Lisa remarked: 
[My partner] is very close to my dad, and she said, "The thing about your 
dad that's so funny, is that if he were traveling and met a Palestinian 
family over dinner he would fall in love with them, and he'd be the 
first person sitting there crying, listening to their story. He would so, 
on a heart level, connect to them." And so for people like that, which is 
most of us really, that's an important thing that he has to experience, 
to get to break through this ignor-you know, naIvete. 
For Lisa and others, as for the reconciliation theologians Yancey discusses, 
humanizing the other was a tremendous first step, but insufficient. When I 
told Lisa that some of her comments resembled those of members of the 
Reconciliation Circle, she remarked: 
I haven't done [Reconciliation Circle work], but the critique is there's 
no political analysis. And what I'm talking about, just trying to talk 
to people in your family, just trying to get through that, the barrier 
is emotional. But of course what you need to get it to is the actual 
political analysis of how we can make it better .... I mean my hope 
would be, with the dialogue groups, [that] people realized we need 
some more, real, fair peace negotiations. That it's actionable, instead 
of, you know, a warm and fuzzy feeling. But yeah, I think all that has 
to happen. 
This politicization speaks to a tension involved in dialogue or reconciliation. 
Talking about one's own feelings and experiences and telling one's personal 
story are the means; participants are urged to avoid talking about politics, pre-
cisely because "politics" involves polarization, needing to win, and armoring 
instead of opening oneself to the other. Yet deep beneath the surface, the ends 
seem to have a political aspect-once people learn to humanize each other, 
they may well come at some level to advocate political transformation. They 
may even come to understand their own people as benefiting from an imbal-
ance of power and privilege. If they state that outright, then those who oppose 
such analyses will object to dialogue. But if they do not, they do a difficult 
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dance, as 69-year-old JJLP member Diane remarked about her own 
at a previous Reconciliation Circle retreat: 
They put us in little talking groups, at different times, and I was with 
an Israeli Jew and an Israeli Palestinian, who lived neighboring towns, 
and who had just put a niche in their fenced off area and some of the 
parents and some of the children were doing projects together, and 
being nice to each other. And you could see, they were both extremely 
nice men, and you could see how very fond they were of each other. The 
question [we were given to discuss] was something like, "What's caus-
ing this rift, or this conflict?" and they were very careful, you know, 
the Israeli Palestinian didn't say that what's causing this conflict is 
that we're being oppressed and persecuted, and I said, "It seems to me 
you can't have balance. You're talking about a mighty military power 
and a basically unarmed people trying to hold on." And so that, I find 
that troublesome. That that truth has to somehow be managed, within 
a dialogue. But on the other hand, there were some profound connec-
tions made. And it's, you know, I have read that Palestinians in the ter-
ritories [of the West Bank and Gaza] only see Jews with guns, pushing 
them around, and Israelis only see Palestinians in suicidal bomb gear. 
So they don't know each other. They never see each other. So, I have 
mixed feelings about it, but it was an amazing experience. 
A story from my field notes taken at a later Reconciliation Circle retreat helps to 
illustrate the complications of this kind of organized "relating." The event was 
the fourth annual retreat of this sort, hosted at a Jewish summer camp, but it 
was a much larger affair than it had been in years past, which presented some 
logistical problems for the organizers. With roughly 200 people in attendance, 
only a quarter were Arab or Arab American. The group was broken into groups 
of four for the first workshop of the day to allow each group member to speak 
uninterrupted for a minute about his or her feelings about each of a number of 
emotionally-and politically-loaded terms, including "right of return," "sui-
cide bomber," and "Jerusalem," but many groups had no Arabs, mine included. 
Dora, a Canadian Jewish woman who was approximately 45 years old, and Orit, 
a 17-year-old Israeli woman, both expressed disappointment that our group 
had no Arabs. "I wanted to talk to some Arabs," Dora commented, "I wanted to 
hear their perspective." While Buber might see such claims as verging on I-it, 
objectifying experiences, the women's reactions were understandable. People 
invested a good deal of time and money, and traveled great distances, to come to 
this event, and they hoped to learn something new from it-to relate to Arabs. 
As it became clear to the organizers that some groups were without Arabs, the 
events were quickly reorganized. For the next session, our group was merged 
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with a group that included Ali, a 30-ish Palestinian high school teacher from 
Jerusalem, and May, a Palestinian American woman who was about 45 years 
old whose father had helped organize the event. Ali started the discussion off, 
asking how our group's morning discussion had gone. 
"It wasn't that interesting," said Dora, "We all pretty much agreed on 
things." 
"Oh," challenged Ali, "so you all agreed that the Palestinian right of 
return would be a bad thing!" 
"Well, I just don't know what would happen to us, to Israelis, to Jews," 
said Orit. "What would happen?" 
"No one ever thought to ask what would happen to the Palestinians 
when the state of Israel was created on our land. Why should anybody 
ask what will happen to Israeli Jews now?" 
"But it's my home," Orit replied. "Where would we go?" 
"It was the Palestinians' home before. No one asked where we would 
go. "11 
The conversation continued in that vein with Ali at the center and members 
of the group taking turns asking him a question or presenting an alternative 
viewpoint, to which he would then respond. Facilitators circulated among the 
groups and would say things like, "Try not to talk about politics. Just focus 
on your feelings," as they walked by ours. At the time, I felt annoyed by the 
whole exercise. I was annoyed with Ali for assuming he knew what I thought, 
without giving me or anyone else a chance to actually speak his or her mind. 
I was annoyed that he had set the terms of the discussion. I was annoyed at 
the way he seemed to steamroll over a 17-year-old. As I reflected on the expe-
rience that afternoon, I thought about it another way: here was a Palestinian 
man visiting from West Jerusalem, coming to a Jewish camp, in the numerical 
minority, with Jewish prayers painted in brightly colored signs on the walls, 
in the United States, a major source of monetary and military support for the 
state of Israel. Everyone ostensibly came to work for peace, but what leads to 
peace? Talking about your feelings? Or asking questions about equality and 
what one sees as preventing it? Would it even be possible for him to talk about 
how he felt about the Palestinian right of return without talking about "poli-
tics"? Would such a discussion feel like anything more than "cheap, artificial, 
and mere words" (Emerson and Smith 2000, 58)? 
Our discussion that afternoon felt like a failure, by the organizers' stan-
dards, because no one gave voice to any breakthroughs. No one embraced 
and said, "Now I know peace is possible." It felt pointless; it enacted Buber's 
description of debate with remarks "so pointed that they may strike home in 
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the sharpest way, and moreover without the [people] that are spoken to being 
regarded in any way present as persons" (1965, 19). No one from our group was 
asked to speak at the concluding press conference. We were not a testament to 
the healing and transformative power of dialogue. Whenever I tried to find Ali 
later to see if he might sit down with me for an interview, he seemed to always 
miss my gaze and walk on. This is the paradox: as Habermas describes, formal 
world systems-polities-are entirely outside the lifeworld, although for Ali 
it might have been impossible to discuss his feelings without discussing the 
inescapable political realities into which he was born. Like Lisa, he might have 
found it more pressing to discuss actionable, concrete realities rather than the 
feelings of those who seemed to him to control his world with laws and military 
power. To open himself to dialogue in the way Buber describes could have been 
unthinkable in this context. 
An anecdote from my previous fieldwork might help to shed light on Ali's 
situation. Because so many pro-gay members of religious communities come 
to their views through relating-to children, friends, siblings, and the like-
pro-gay movements often rely on the strategy of asking gay men or lesbians 
to speak informally to a group of interested members, a class, or a discussion 
group. But given that putative heterosexuals bear no stigma for their orienta-
tion and are often in the numerical majority that makes policy, such events 
can feel like an audition-either for oneself or on behalf of the entire stigma-
tized group-for full entry into the moral community, particularly if saying 
the wrong thing can affect the decisions of those with the authority to make 
policy. While this strategy may introduce the issues to people and inspire fur-
ther thought and inquiry, I have neither seen nor heard of it changing many 
minds, particularly in cases where people are already firm in their convictions. 
Such forums seem more often to produce what Buber would call technical dia-
logues or monologues disguised as dialogue. 
Midway through my research in United Methodist congregations, Jenny, a 
friend and key informant, invited me to join her at her parents' church where she 
had been invited to speak as a lesbian about what inclusion in the church meant 
to her. We had discussed my analysis that gay men and lesbians in my study 
were repeatedly cast as being pained and how "gay pain" became the reason 
for many members to welcome them into the church, and she was determined 
not to fall into that pattern; she was not in pain, and she believed there were 
compelling theological reasons for the church to welcome LGBT people. But the 
structure of the event itself caused a sort of pain, or at least a demonstration 
of pain. As the event began about twenty people sat in a circle and Jenny was 
introduced. She had prepared remarks around the theme that human beings 
cannot always know God's will, but that God can surprise people, calling us to 
do things that go against societal expectations. She began by reading scriptural 
stories of prophets and disciples being called to drop everything they knew in 
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life and heed God's surprising call. But before she had completed her first sen-
tence, she was in tears. She struggled to get her message out while crying, and 
soon several others, myself included, were crying as well and someone had to 
be dispatched to find a box of tissues. The very question at stake, the purpose 
for the gathering, was the question she had hoped to take as already answered: 
whether she had equal access to God's revelation, whether she was a full person 
in the eyes of God and the church, whether the stigma she bore resulted from 
social conventions or timeless truth. It is difficult for a community discussion 
of who belongs in the community-of who can speak for the community and 
who can only, at its discretion, speak to it-to produce conditions of full equal-
ity within that community since the question itself prefigures some members' 
exclusion. 
In Udis-Kessler's (2008) research, inclusionists thought that if conserva-
tives just "knew our people," they would change their minds; in the inclusion-
ists' lifeworld, God makes some people gay, and same-sex love and intimacy 
teach people more about God's love. This knowledge comes from the relating 
that happens in the lifeworld, so their knowledge cannot be explained to their 
opponents in any satisfactorily objective-seeming terms. Those who believe 
homosexuality is sinful, on the other hand, see homosexuality and all it sym-
bolizes to them (selfishness, carnality, politics, chaos, and the like; see Moon 
2004) as firmly entrenched in the formal world-what evangelicals consider 
the fallen, human world. They cannot enter intersubjectivity with inclusionists 
because their prior understanding of homosexuality and what it symbolizes 
does not permit entrance into the realm of relating into their moral commu-
nity. The symbolic violence LGBT people and their supporters experience in 
Udis-Kessler's study is the violence of being forcibly shut out of their lifeworld, 
their church, by those with the authority to do so-in terms of votes and tradi-
tion. In my own research (2004, 2005a), this pain became the admission price 
for the lifeworld to which they thought they had belonged all along: for gay 
and lesbian members to be seen as truly belonging in the church, they must 
perform pain; they cannot present themselves as whole persons simply seek-
ing what any church member seeks in church. But to be forced to represent 
only one aspect of one's personhood-and a wounded aspect at that-is not 
relating; one's "whole self" is not quite welcome, but only the broken parts that 
fit within a particular, strategic narrative. That scenario becomes another of 
what Buber calls "faceless specters of dialogue" (1965, 20), in which one cannot 
relate or be related to because parts of oneself are silenced and one must take 
care to appear a certain way. 
Returning to Ali at the retreat, to what extent does dialogue feel like "audi-
tioning" for membership in the moral community of people who have a greater 
say than oneself over policies and the distribution of resources? As Diane 
asks, to what extent do some people's personal stories seem too "political" for 
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dialogue, and what happens to dialogue when aspects of some personal sto-
ries are unspeakable? The goal of the weekend was to foster relating, and it 
succeeded in many cases. To relate to people previously outside one's lifeworld 
context involves some kind of feeling of sacrifice, for everyone involved. But 
to what extent might such an event feel to Palestinians the way it can feel for 
a gay person to be asked to speak to a group of people who mayor may not 
believe that he or she is a living symbol of sin, fallenness, and carnality? To 
what extent might such a conversation feel like an audition to be recognized as 
fully human or a much-needed opportunity to convince those who might have 
more political leverage that there is something profoundly unfair happening 
that needs to be changed? 
On a hike after the incident at the retreat, I spent some time getting to 
know a friendly man who was around 50 years old, a Jewish man named Saul. 
He expressed an interest in political discussions, so I asked him whether 
he thought there was anything odd about trying to talk about something 
like the Palestinian right of return without talking about politics. He gave it 
some thought and got back to me later, saying: 
I was thinking about what you said and I had a conversation with a 
woman named Bobbie. She had a communication problem with a man 
that left her feeling misunderstood. They talked about it later and 
cleared it up. I think it's good that we leave politics aside and focus on 
just trying to understand each other. [Reconstructed in notes.] 
He had a point, but after the event when I interviewed Jamil, a Palestinian 
involved in a Reconciliation Circle, he hesitated to answer many questions 
and repeatedly referred me instead to a local Palestinian advocacy group. I 
left our two-hour interview with the distinct impression that as a spokesper-
son for reconciliation, he did not feel he could say anything verging on the 
political. 
The Paradox of Dialogue 
As Buber argues about relating, Habermas argues that in communicative 
action, people are transformed. He writes: 
Communicative action is not only a process of reaching understanding; 
in coming to an understanding about something in the world, actors 
are at the same time taking part in interactions through which they 
develop, confirm and renew their memberships in social groups and 
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their own identities. Communicative actions are not only processes 
of interpretation in which cultural knowledge is "tested against the 
world"; they are at the same time processes of social integration and of 
socialization. (1981, 139) 
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When a new grouping is formed, in the case of the Reconciliation Circle, 
or when the group's stated membership criteria are in flux, in the case of 
Protestant homosexuality debates, the collectivity and participants' personal 
self-concepts are redefined. But in cases like these that can be prefigured by 
tacit speech-rules about what can and cannot be said, particularly about 
power relations, these redefinitions are not complete, real though they may 
feel to those at the unacknowledged top of the hierarchy. These hierarchies, 
when unspoken, can be tacitly reproduced as well, particularly if there are 
double standards about who can tell his or her own story in his or her own 
way, whose story is legitimate, and what kinds of personal truths are too 
"political" to be uttered. In those cases, stigmatization is reproduced, even as 
those closer to the top of the hierarchy genuinely feel that they have trans-
formed, given of themselves, or made themselves vulnerable in the name of 
reconciliation. The gag rule impedes those at the bottom from being fully 
expressive, from feeling understood, and perhaps from being transformed 
in the process. As Buber (1988 [1965]) posits, genuine dialogue is free from 
needing to appear a certain way to another. However, if people are allowed 
to "discuss politics," then the whole concept of dialogue could easily revert 
to the polarized conflict dialoguers commit to sacrificing and transcending. 
This is the paradox. 
There are solutions to this paradox. One is to avoid dialogue altogether, 
ridiculing it as naively idealistic or banal or seeking to discredit its partici-
pants as traitors. On the other hand, some maintain that politics and rela-
tionship come together; they commit to solidarity and can hear political 
critiques of their own power and privilege without feeling personally attacked. 
Politicization can light a path forward. When genuine dialogue occurs, people 
feel transformed, spoken to, understood. But the line between genuine dia-
logue and the imitations Buber discusses is not always clear. When genuine 
dialogue happens, social hierarchies that were previously naturalized can 
come to seem profoundly arbitrary and unfair. But since dialogue cannot be 
objectively assessed, a semblance of it can renaturalize the hierarchies it fails 
to demystify. Still, dialogue and the relating that takes place in it are real 
phenomena that we need to consider when we think about hierarchies in com-
munities and when we think about the relationship between social power and 
the self. Indeed, when we ignore it, we cannot understand the social change 
that happens, and does not happen, in communities bound by relationship. 
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Taking reconciliation/dialogue seriously calls us to consider the boundar_ 
ies people draw between social convention and timeless truth, lines straddled 
by both institutional knowledge (religious and otherwise) and extra-institu_ 
tional forms of knowledge (religious and otherwise). If sociologists consider 
only institutional religion in our studies of how people make their lives mean-
ingful, we close our eyes to the fact that to be defined as "truth" one must 
define it-whatever one believes it to be-as transcendent. In that sense, 
religious and nonreligious contexts overlap considerably (and where a person 
feels at home depends on where one has found truth). Acknowledging that 
considerable overlap, we can see more clearly the profound ways in which 
those with more privilege to define the terms of dialogue can-as they try 
sincerely to express what feels deeply true to them-delegitimize others' 
truths, and silence the very people with whom they wish to reconcile. 
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Notes 
1. As Gamson (1992) discusses, the naming of this conflict is itself highly controver-
sial. Given that many of the Arabs most directly implicated in this struggle identify as 
Palestinian and are identified by other respondents as such, I use this term. I thus refer to 
the conflict as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
2. In addition, I conducted two focus groups involving another twenty-seven respondents. 
3. To protect confidentiality, names and some identifying details of people and organiza-
tions have been changed. 
4. Helpful summaries of the ideological and political tensions appear in Lerner (2003) and 
Ruether and Ruether (2002). 
5. For a more representative study of American Jewish attitudes, see Cohen and Eisen (2000). 
6. British legal scholar Anthony Julius has argued that the state of Israel's founding father 
Theodor Herzl envisioned that with their own state, Jews would have "ordinary enemies," 
fighting over ordinary things like borders and resources (Julius 2007; see Herzl 1988 
[1896], chapter IV). 
7. Habermas (1981) makes a similar argument but does not discuss Buber. 
8. While Ich-Du is conventionally translated as I-thou, Kaufmann argues that this transla-
tion, with the archaic quality of "thou," fails to capture the familiarity of Du, the intimate 
you that a child would use with his or her parents or that intimate friends use, which is 
what Kaufmann argues that Buber intends. 
9. Printed in Buber (1965). 
10. Respondent quotations are from recorded interviews unless otherwise noted and have 
been edited for readability (for instance, by removing extraneous utterances such as "urn" 
and "like"). 
11. These discussions were reconstructed in field notes. 
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